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Margaret Berger and Aaron Twerski are among the leading scholars in 
their respective fields of Evidence and Products Liability. I have benefited 
from their work on many occasions. 1 Precisely because of the deserved re­
spect and esteem in which Berger and Twerski are held-not to mention 
the prominence of their forum, the Michigan Law Review-their proposal 
to create a new "informed choice" cause of action in pharmaceutical litiga­
tion is likely to receive sympathetic attention. Because I believe that their 
* Professor, George Mason University School of Law; Visiting Professor, University of 
Michigan Law School, 2005--06. B.A. 1988, Brandeis; J.D. 2001 ,  Yale. -Ed. The author thanks 
Michael Abramowicz, Ted Frank, Michael Green, Richard Nagareda, and Joseph Sanders for helpful 
comments, and Dr. Robert Brent for reviewing the accuracy of this Article's discussion of the scien­
tific evidence regarding Bendectin. Any remaining errors are the author's responsibility. The Law 
and Economics Center at the George Mason University School of Law provided funding for this 
Article. 
1 .  Among other things, I frequently refer to Professor Berger's Evidence treatise and use 
Dean Twerski's casebook in my Products Liability class. 
1961 
1962 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 196 1  
proposal is ill-conceived and dangerous, I feel compelled (with some trepi­
dation) to write this response. 
Berger and Twerski propose that courts recognize an informed choice 
cause of action that would allow plaintiffs claiming injury from pharmaceu­
tical products to recover damages for deprivation of informed choice when 
(1) the causal relationship between the toxic agent and plaintiff's harm is 
unresolved at the time of litigation and will likely remain unresolved; (2) the 
drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is to avoid discomfort or to 
improve lifestyle; (3) it is almost certain that a patient made aware of the 
risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption of the drug would 
have refused to take it; and ( 4) defendant drug company was aware of the 
potential risk or should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the 
risk and failed to provide the requisite information to the physician or pa­
tient. 2 
These guidelines, however, are rather vague. Whether they are meant to 
apply broadly or narrowly means the difference between a cause of action 
that would open a Pandora's Box of litigation and one that would be avail­
able only in limited, perhaps even extraordinary, circumstances. Apparently, 
Berger and Twerski intend the scope of the informed choice action to be 
broad indeed. So broad, in fact, that if adopted it could lead to an unprece­
dented wave of litigation against pharmaceutical manufacturers, including 
lawsuits involving products that are completely safe and effective. 
Berger and Twerski suggest that the paradigmatic example illustrating 
the need for the informed choice cause of action is the failure of plaintiffs to 
recover damages from the maker of Bendectin. The plaintiffs contended that 
this morning sickness drug caused their children's birth defects. As demon­
strated below, in Part I of this Essay, if the proposed informed choice tort's 
boundaries are broad enough to allow the Bendectin plaintiffs to recover 
damages, then they are extraordinarily, dangerously broad. Part II of this 
Essay argues that even if Berger and Twerski had chosen a better example 
that would allow for a much more limited interpretation of the scope of their 
proposal, the proposal still has significant weaknesses that render it a very 
bad idea. 
I. INFORMED CHOICE AND THE BENDECTIN TRAGEDY 
Litigation claiming that Bendectin caused limb reduction and other birth 
defects began in the late 1970s and did not end until at least 2000. It in­
volved thousands of plaintiffs and tens of millions of dollars in defense 
costs, and led to many pioneering judicial rulings excluding plaintiffs' scien­
tific evidence. Most significant, Bendectin was the underlying subject of 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,3 the Supreme Court case that 
2. Margaret A. Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice: Unmasking 
Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005). 
3. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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ushered in the modem era in which courts subject questioned expert testi­
mony to meaningful scrutiny to ensure its reliability. 
Perhaps because Berger and Twerski seek to "unmask" Daubert, they 
invoke the Bendectin litigation to justify their informed choice proposal. 
They suggest that although the Bendectin plaintiffs could not prove causa­
tion, the Bendectin plaintiffs could have met the criteria they lay out for an 
informed choice cause of action. If so, a review of the history of the Bendec­
tin litigation reveals that their proposal is unjust, unworkable, and 
counterproductive. 
Criterion 1: The causal relationship between the toxic agent 
and plaintiff's harm is unresolved at the time of litigation 
and will likely remain unresolved. 
Neither pioneering Bendectin plaintiff Betty Mekdeci-whose "an­
guished cry" Berger and Twerski say they are responding to 4-nor any of 
the subsequent Bendectin plaintiffs ever had sound reason to believe that 
Bendectin caused limb reduction birth defects, the main focus of the Ben­
dectin litigation. In 1977, when Mekdeci brought her lawsuit, fourteen 
epidemiological studies of varying strength and quality had examined the 
relationship between Bendectin and birth defects and found no association.5 
While these studies were not powerful enough to rule out some connection 
between Bendectin and birth defects, they certainly provided no cause for 
alarm. Bendectin had been on the market since 1956 with no serious doubts 
raised regarding its safety in the scientific or medical community. Nor did 
Bendectin contain suspiciously toxic ingredients: one active ingredient of 
Bendectin was a simple B vitamin, and the other was an ingredient used in a 
popular over-the-counter sleeping pill. 
Meanwhile, Mekdeci's evidence that Bendectin did cause birth defects 
was "remarkably thin."6 Many chemicals are known not to be teratogens in 
humans, so the mere fact that pregnant women ingested a pharmaceutical 
product such as Bendectin did not mean there was an inherent risk. Beyond 
the mere fact that she ingested Bendectin during pregnancy and later gave 
birth to a child with a limb reduction birth defect, Mekdeci's evidence of 
causation consisted primarily of eighty-six reports to the FDA of other 
women who had also given birth to children with limb reduction defects 
after taking Bendectin.7 These reports are the direct source of Mekdeci's 
complaint, implicitly endorsed by Berger and Twerski, that Bendectin's 
4. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 289. 
5. JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL 70 (1998). 
6. Id. at 7. 
7. MICHAEL GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECT 106, 124 (1997). 
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manufacturer should have warned of a possible association with birth de­
fects. 8 
Berger and Twerski acknowledge that "[t]he mere fact that a child was 
born with a limb reduction to a mother who had ingested Bendectin did not 
necessarily point to Bendectin as the cause of the birth defect."9 In fact, the 
mere fact that dozens or even hundreds of children were reported to have 
been born with limb reductions after their mothers ingested Bendectin 
doesn't, by itself, even suggest a risk. Approximately thirty million women 
took Bendectin, and by chance alone there would be ten thousand limb re­
duction defects among children born to these women. JO 
Berger and Twerski apparently see the issue of whether Bendectin 
caused birth defects as "unresolved" at the time of litigation. As noted 
above, when the Bendectin litigation began, the relevant research was not 
strong enough to rule out the possibility that Bendectin caused a small in­
crease in birth defects, but there was no reason to rule in that possibility 
either. There was never any valid scientific evidence supporting the proposi­
tion that Bendectin was a teratogen. 
As interest in the teratogenicity of Bendectin increased due to the litiga­
tion, evidence quickly piled up that Bendectin was safe. No animal studies 
using doses equivalent or even substantially above human therapeutic doses 
showed teratogenicity.11 Most epidemiological studies produced no statisti­
cally significant findings.12 The few positive studies13 each found an 
association with a different, unrelated birth defect, a pattern consistent with 
random chance or imperfections in the studies, but not with causation by 
Bendectin.14 Meanwhile, other studies reported a negative association be-
8. Mekdeci said: "I feel like there were certainly enough [adverse reactions of limb reduc­
tion in children born after their mothers had taken Bendectin to alleviate symptoms of nausea] 
reported, given our bad reporting system . . .  to have warranted some kind of acknowledgment of 
this on the labeling and to physicians." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 257-58 (quoting Deposi­
tion of Plaintiff Elizabeth Mekdeci). 
Putting the case reports aside, should Ms. Mekdeci and others similarly situated have been 
warned about potential birth defects, given that Bendectin had not been adequately tested to rule out 
the possibility that it was a relatively weak teratogen? To the extent that physicians reportedly told 
patients that Bendectin was proven "totally safe" before the 1980s, this information was inaccurate. 
But given that there was no particular reason to believe that Bendectin caused birth defects, and, as 
noted above, some reason to believe it didn't, Bendectin was logically in the category of many 
pharmaceuticals prescribed to pregnant women today, with regard to which doctors say "we can't 
absolutely guarantee it's safe, but any risk is minimal." 
9. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 261. 
IO. Robert L. Brent, Bendectin: Review of the Medical Literature of a Comprehensively 
Studied Human Nonteratogen and the Most Prevalent Tonogen-Litigen, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 
337, 340 (1995). It should also be kept in mind that obstetricians were especially likely to report a 
temporal relationship between Bendectin ingestion and birth defects because of the still-fresh cau­
tionary example of Thalidomide. 
11. Id. at 340. 
12. Jeffrey S. Kutcher et al., Bendectin and Binh Defects II: Ecological Analyses, 67 BIRTH 
DEFECTS REs, PART A: CLINICAL AND MOLECULAR ThRATOLOGY 88 (2003). 
13. See id. at 89. 
14. Brent, supra note 10, at 339 (emphasizing the importance of consistency of results in 
determining a "real" association). 
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tween Bendectin and specific birth defects.15 Moreover, the results of spe­
cific studies showing an association between Bendectin and various 
unrelated birth defects were invariably not replicable.16 By the early 1980s, 
there was a solid consensus in the medical community that Bendectin was 
not a teratogen. Nevertheless, the litigation continued. 
Berger and Twerski state that the manufacturer withdrew Bendectin 
from the market "due to widespread fears that it caused severe birth defects 
in the children whose mothers mgested the drug while pregnant."17 As with 
other phantom risks, 18 however, the fears in question were the unreasonable 
fears of the lay public-stirred by irresponsible interest groups,19 hired gun 
and delusional experts, credulous media coverage,20 and plaintiffs' law­
yers21 -not the fears of the manufacturer, the FDA, or the scientific . 22 commuruty. 
Over time Bendectin became the most-studied drug used during preg­
nancy, and "the massive amount of data does not support a consistent 
statistical association between Bendectin usage in pregnancy and a particu­
lar syndrome or group of malformations."23 Two meta-analyses of the data 
from all the epidemiological studies showed no association between Ben­
dectin and birth defects.24 The negative epidemiological data are supported 
by "ecological analyses" showing that the withdrawal of Bendectin from the 
15. See Kutcher et al., supra note 12, at 89. 
16. Brent, supra note 10, at 338-39. 
17. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 268. 
18. See KENNETH R. FOSTER ET AL., PHANTOM RISK: SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE AND THE LAW 
32 (1993); David E. Bernstein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REv. 457, 461 (1999) (book 
review). 
19. The Public Citizen's Health Research Group consistently claimed, against the weight of 
the evidence, that Bendectin was dangerous. Louis Lasagna & Sheila R. Shulman, Bendectin and 
the Language of Causation, in PHANTOM RISK, supra note 18, at 101, 107-09. 
20. See, e.g., Mark Dowie & Carolyn Marshall, The Bendectin Cover-Up, MOTHER JONES, 
Nov. 1980, at 43; Expens Reveal . . .  Common Drug Causing Deformed Babies, NAT'L ENQUIRER, 
Oct. 9, 1979, at 20; John de St. Jorre, The Morning Sickness Drug Controversy, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 
1980 (Magazine), at 11. 
21. Melvin Belli, in particular, was responsible for turning Mekdeci's lone case against Ben­
dectin into a flood of litigation, not least by feeding a dramatic story comparing Bendectin to 
Thalidomide to the National Enquirer. See GREEN, supra note 7, at 134, 183. 
22. See C. I. Barash & L. Lasagna, The Bendectin Saga: "Voluntary" Discontinuation, 1 J. 
CLINICAL RES. DRUG DEV. 277 (1987). The FDA, reviewing a petition for approval of a generic 
version of Bendectin in 1999, confirmed that Bendectin was not withdrawn from sale "for reasons 
of safety or effectiveness." Determination that Bendectin Was Not Withdrawn From Sale for Rea­
sons of Safety or Effectiveness, 64 Fed. Reg. 43190 (Aug. 9, 1999); see also SANDERS, supra note 5, 
at 31; Gideon Koren et al., Drugs in Pregnancy, 338 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1128, 1129 (1998) (stating 
that Bendectin was withdrawn despite a substantial body of evidence that it was safe). 
23. Brent, supra note 10, at 338; see, e.g., Patricia H. Shiono & Mark A. Klebanoff, Bendec­
tin and Human Congenital Ma/formations, 40 TERATOLOGY 151 (1989) (concluding that there is no 
increase in the overall rate of major malformations after exposure to Bendectin). 
24. Kutcher et al., supra note 12, at 96. 
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U.S. market did not lead to a reduction in any category of birth defects.25 A 
2003 study concluded that the fact that the rate of birth defects remained 
constant after Merrell Dow withdrew Bendectin from the market is not con­
sistent with the hypothesis that Bendectin is a teratogen.26 
A review of the relevant medical literature finds a consensus that Ben­
dectin is not a teratogen.27 Prominent teratologist Robert Brent concluded in 
1995 that "[t]here has never been a drug that has been studied so completely 
.. .. These data do not even suggest that Bendectin administration during 
pregnancy represents a reproductive or teratogenic risk."28 The Food and 
Drug Administration, the World Health Organization, and the March of 
Dimes have all found that Bendectin is not a teratogen,29 as did (well before 
the Bendectin litigation concluded) the governments of Canada,30 the United 
Kingdom, Switzerland, West Germany, and Australia.31 Meanwhile, none of 
the experts who testified for the plaintiffs in the Bendectin litigation has ever 
published "an analysis, review, or research paper that indicated that Bendec­
tin was a human teratogen."32 
If Berger and Twerski believe that the causal relationship between Ben­
dectin and the birth defects of the Bendectin plaintiffs was "unresolved" 
during the litigation (which continued through at least 2000!33) and (as I 
25. Id. at 96; C. Ineke Neutel & Helen L. Johansen, Measuring Drug Effectiveness By De­
fault: The Case of Bendectin, 68 CANADIAN J. Pue. HEALTH 66, 69-70 (1995). 
26. Kutcher et al., supra note 12, at 96. 
27. Raafat Bishai et al., Critical Appraisal of Drug Therapy for Nausea and Vomiting of 
Pregnancy: II. Efficacy and safety of Diclectin (doxylamine-B6), 7 CANADIAN J. CLINICAL PHAR­
MACOLOGY 138, 139 (2000) (stating that views that Bendectin is unsafe are "unsubstantiated fears 
created by misinformation and misperceptions"); D. Jewell & G. Young, Interventions for Nausea 
and Vomiting in Early Pregnancy, THE COCHRANE DATABASE OF SYSTEMATIC REVIEWS, 2003, Issue 
4, Art. No.: CD000145 (remarking that observational studies show "no evidence of teratogenicity" 
from Bendectin); Laura A. Magee et al., Evidence-Based View of Safety and Effectiveness of Phar­
macologic Therapy for Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnancy (NVP), 186 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & 
GYNECOLOGY S256 (2002) (concluding that Bendectin is "safe and effective" for treating morning 
sickness); P. Mazzotta et al., Attitudes, Management and Consequences of Nausea and Vomiting of 
Pregnancy in the United States and Canada, 70 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 359, 360 
(2000) (stating that claims that Bendectin has teratogenic effects "were subsequently proven to be 
unsubstantiated"); Jennifer R. Niebyl, Overview of Nausea and Vomiting of Pregnancy with an Em­
phasis on Vitamins and Ginger, 186 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY S253, S254 (May 2002) 
("[N]o other agent given in pregnancy has more conclusive safety data with regard to teratogenic­
ity."). 
28. Brent, supra note IO, at 343. 
29. Thomas H. Strong, Jr., Alternative Therapies of Morning Sickness, 44 CLINICAL OB­
STETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 653, 656 (2001). 
30. See Melanie Ornstein et al., Bendectin/Diclectin for Morning Sickness: A Canadian 
Follow-up of an American Tragedy, 9 REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 1, 2-3 (1995). 
31. See SANDERS, supra note 5, at 87. 
32. Brent, supra note IO, at 344. In this context, it is significant that Berger and Twerski cite 
none of the medical or scientific literature on either Bendectin or nausea and vomiting of pregnancy 
(NVP). Had they done so, they would have found that while the Bendectin litigation and its ultimate 
resolution may remain "controversial" among lawyers, the scientific and medical literature is abso­
lutely one-sided. 
33. See Blum ex rel. Blum v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 764 A.2d I (Pa. 2000). 
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read their article) remains "unresolved" now, one struggles to conceive of 
any purported causal relationship that they would acknowledge has been 
resolved. 
Criterion 2: The drug is not therapeutic but rather its purpose is 
to avoid discomf011 or to improve lifestyle. 
According to Berger and Twerski, the "assault on autonomy" through 
lack of informed consent "is especially egregious in the case of lifestyle 
drugs where the drug has little therapeutic value." They admit that "there is 
no bright line that can be drawn between lifestyle and therapeutic drugs," 
but consider Bendectin to be a lifestyle drug.34 This suggests that the cate­
gory of "lifestyle" drug is extremely broad. 
Bendectin was used to treat symptoms of pregnancy commonly known 
as morning sickness, and known in the medical literature as nausea and 
vomiting of pregnancy ("NVP"). For some women, NVP is a very serious 
complication of pregnancy. Approximately 1 % of pregnant women require 
hospitalization due to severe vomiting.35 More generally, women who ex­
perience severe vomiting "are at increased risk for preeclampsia [a toxic 
condition whose symptoms include high blood pressure], intrauterine 
growth retardation, and hospitalization."36 A significant fraction of women 
who suffer from severe NVP consider terminating their pregnancies.37 One 
study found that approximately 3% of severe NVP sufferers have an abor­
tion that they attribute to their desire to end their NVP symptoms.38 
For a much greater number of women, NVP is "merely" extremely un­
pleasant and somewhat debilitating. Researchers estimate that NVP impairs 
the daily routine of 35% of pregnant women.39 
Bendectin was the only FDA-approved drug to treat NVP.40 Withdrawal 
of Bendectin may have actually slightly increased birth defect rates, as 
mothers with severe NVP have difficulty getting proper nutrition4 1 and some 
pregnant women used "off-label" prescription remedies or "alternative" 
therapies that had "little, if any, safety information" to relieve their suffer-
• 42 mg. 
34. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 288. 
35. Niebyl, supra note 27, at 253. 
36. Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 1. 
37. Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 364; Paolo Mazzotta et al., Factors Associated with 
Elective Termination of Pregnancy among Canadian and American Women with Nausea and Vomit­
ing of Pregnancy, 22 J. PSYCHOSOMATIC OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 7 (2001). 
38. Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 361. 
39. Niebyl, supra note 27, at 253. Berger and Twerski dismiss NVP, apparently for all 
women who suffer from it, as merely "the discomfort of nausea." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 
288 n.149. 
40. Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 360. 
41. Neutel & Johansen, supra note 25, at 70. 
42. Strong, supra note 29, at 656. 
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Several studies have compared the effects of NVP in the U.S. and Can­
ada. One study found that in both countries, hospitalization rates for NVP 
doubled when Bendectin was removed from the market following the litiga­
tion scare of the early 1980s.43 Once Bendectin (in a generic version) 
returned to the Canadian market in 1989,44 hospitalization rates declined in 
Canada in parallel with increased prescriptions for the drug, while American 
hospitalization rates remained constant.45 Another study concluded that 
"American patients tended to lose, on average, more weight during their 
NVP, were hospitalized more often than their Canadian counterparts despite 
similar distribution of the severity of symptoms, and lost more time from 
paid work."46 This study concluded that the absence of Bendectin had caused 
"American women unwarranted and preventable suffering."47 The with­
drawal of Bendectin from the market was, as one article puts it, "an 
American tragedy."48 
Criterion 3: It is almost certain that a patient made aware of 
the risk that is alleged to be associated with consumption 
of the drug would have refused to take it. 
Berger and Twerski argue that "[t]here is little doubt that the vast major­
ity of expectant mothers suffering from the discomfort of morning sickness 
would have refused to take Bendectin to alleviate their discomfort if told 
that the drug carried with it an uncertain risk of birth defects to their fe­
tuses."49 In fact, this depends on how the "risk" would have been portrayed. 
If the risk was portrayed as "there is an uncertain risk of birth defects" from 
Bendectin, Berger and Twerski are likely correct. If it was portrayed more 
accurately as "we can never guarantee with absolute certainty that a drug 
will not cause birth defects, but Bendectin has been used safely for over 
twenty years, the FDA and the scientific community believe that it is the 
only drug safe and effective for treating NVP, and there is no reputable evi­
dence to the contrary," the vast majority of women would have reasonably 
decided to take Bendectin to relieve NVP.50 
More generally, this raises the issue of what Berger and Twerski con­
sider a "risk" worth informing patients about. Berger and Twerski are 
43. Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 2-3. 
44. Id. at I .  
45. Id. 
46. Mazzotta et al., supra note 27, at 360. 
47. Id. at 365. 
48. Ornstein et al., supra note 30, at 1. 
49. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 269. 
50. This is how the risk should have been reasonably portrayed to women, and women with 
mild symptoms of NVP may have chosen to avoid even this "risk." The evidence suggests, however, 
that some women were inaccurately told by their physicians that Bendectin was "proven safe." For 
further discussion, see supra note 8. 
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inspired in part by the Davii1 and Reyes52 cases, in which plaintiffs, whose 
children contracted polio from the oral polio vaccine, sued the manufacturer 
of the vaccine for not disclosing to patients the (well-established) one in a 
million risk that the vaccine could itself cause polio. Yet a one in a million 
risk is so small a risk that, prospectively, no reasonable person would worry 
about it. Consider that over a two-year period, the average American has a 
greater than a one in a million chance of being killed by a lightning strike.53 
The one in a million risk is put in even starker perspective when one recog­
nizes that being vaccinated for polio actually significantly reduced the 
overall risk of polio to the vaccinee.54 
More generally, a one in a million risk is so low that a drug manufac­
turer could almost certainly never guarantee that an individual drug (or for 
that matter, many food products!) poses less than this risk of birth defects. 
Does that mean that every product ingested by women of childbearing age 
need carry a warning, even if it has been studied extensively and shown not 
to be teratogenic? 
Or, returning to the Bendectin example, does the fact that a few outliers 
and hired guns are willing to speculate that a drug causes birth defects mean 
that there is a meaningful "risk" of birth defects? If so, every relevant phar­
maceutical product sold in the United States should carry a warning about 
any conceivable harm that any credentialed doctor or scientist could imagine 
may arise from using it. 
Criterion 4: Defendant drug company was aware of the potential risk or 
should have undertaken reasonable testing to discover the risk and failed 
to provide the requisite information to the physician or patient. 
Berger and Twerski conclude that the risk of birth defects from Bendec­
tin was a "material risk" that should have been disclosed to physicians or 
patients because "it is impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin 
51. Davis v. Wyeth Labs., Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1968). 
52. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1274 (5th Cir. 1974). 
53. How Likely Are You to Be Struck by Lightning, http://www.stats.org/record.jsp?type= 
news&ID=402 (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
54. The Davis court argued that while the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine was 
approximately one in a million, the risk of contracting polio from other sources was also approxi­
mately one in a million, so that a rational person might have chosen not to take the risk from the 
vaccine. The court, however, failed elementary statistics, which points to the hazards of trusting the 
judicial system with public risk management. The polio vaccine need be given only once, with the 
one in a million risk providing lifelong immunity. The one in a million risk of contracting polio 
otherwise was, by the court's own reckoning, annual, and thus, over a period of years, far greater 
than the risk of contracting polio from the vaccine." 
It's especially odd that Berger and Twerski use these cases as positive models because it was 
undisputed in both cases that the risk from the polio vaccine was disclosed to the medical commu­
nity. Berger and Twerski suggest, see Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 278, that drug 
manufacturers would escape liability under their "failure to warn" tort if they "alert physicians so 
they in turn can provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful choice." 
So by their own lights, the polio vaccine cases should be examples of litigation run amok. 
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created a small risk.55 The primary allegation against Bendectin was that it 
caused "limb reduction" birth defects, as in the Mekdeci case, but plaintiffs 
in other cases alleged that Bendectin caused many other, unrelated, fetal 
problems, ranging from mental retardation to cleft lip to deafness to club 
feet,56 and including even genetic defects.57 As with limb reduction defects, it 
is "impossible to rule out" the possibility that Bendectin causes any of these 
defects, because "proving that Bendectin does not cause birth defects is 
logically impossible."58 Under the informed choice proposal, these plaintiffs, 
like Ms. Mekdeci, would deserve compensation for lack of informed con­
sent for the nonexistent "risk" to which they were exposed.59 
Thus, considering the four informed choice criteria discussed above in 
the context of Bendectin, one concludes that a pharmaceutical manufacturer 
could be held liable for failure to provide informed choice: (a) even when 
there was never any sound scientific evidence suggesting that the product 
caused the harm at issue and there was an unbroken consensus among lead­
ing experts in the field that the product did not cause such harm; (b) when 
the product prevented serious harm to a significant number of patients and 
prevented substantial discomfort to a much greater number, even when there 
were no available alternative products; (c) when a plaintiff claims that she 
would not have taken the product had she been informed of an incredibly 
remote and completely unproven risk; and (d) when the defendant is unable 
to do what will generally be impossible, that is, prove that there is no possi­
bility that the product in question causes the harm alleged. The example of 
Bendectin, then, suggests that adoption of the informed choice proposal 
would be an epic mistake. 
55. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 280. 
56. Brent, supra note JO, at 342. 
57. Robert Brent, Bendectin and Binh Defects: Hopefully the Final Chapter, 67 BIRTH DE­
FECTS RES. 79, 82 (2003). 
58. Lasagna & Shulman, supra note 1 9, at 109. One cannot, as a general matter, prove a 
negative, and certainly not with epidemiological studies or other tools currently at scientists' dis­
posal. See Margaret A. Berger, Convening Unknown Risk into Phantom Risk, in Books-on-Law: 
Book Reviews (Sept. 1 999), http://jurist.Iaw.pitt.edu/lawbooks/revsep99.htm#Berger (reviewing 
PHANTOM RtsK, supra note 1 8) ("Epidemiological studies are incapable of proving that something 
has no effects . . . .  "). 
59. Indeed, Berger and Twerski might allow these plaintiffs to be compensated if they were 
not apprised of the risk of limb reduction defects even though their children did not suffer this par­
ticular problem. They praise Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1 997), a case in which the 
plaintiffs were unable to produce any expert evidence of a relationship between the mother's inges­
tion of Provera and their baby's limb reduction defect. The court nevertheless allowed recovery for 
"wrongful birth" because the plaintiff's physician failed to warn that at the time of her pregnancy, 
there was concern that Provera caused congenital defects, including limb reductions. Had the mother 
been warned she may have aborted the child. The dissent eviscerates the majority's logic, which 
eliminates proximate cause from the tort of wrongful birth. 
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II. A BROADER C RITIQUE OF THE INFORMED C HOICE PROPOSAL 
Quite properly, Berger and Twerski might protest that their proposal 
shouldn't stand or fall on the poorly chosen example of Bendectin.60 There 
may very well be another product-say, Parlodel, which Berger and Twerski 
also discuss-whose history would support an informed choice cause of 
action under a far narrower interpretation of the proposed criteria. However, 
the informed choice proposal would still have weaknesses that make it a 
very bad idea, as discussed below. 
A. The Proposal Invites Reliance on Unreliable Testimony 
Berger and Twerski note that a great deal of marginal testimony on cau­
sation in toxic torts cases has been excluded under the Daubert trilogy. 
However, they argue that much of this testimony would be admissible in an 
informed choice action. Defendants would be hard-pressed, they argue, to 
successfully challenge plaintiffs' experts on their ability to assess risk, given 
that they generally have the appropriate academic credentials. 61 
Risk assessment experts with appropriate credentials will certainly be 
qualified to appear as experts. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 (incorporating 
and clarifying the Daubert trilogy), however, requires that testimony by a 
qualified expert ( 1) be "based upon sufficient facts or data", (2) be "the 
product of reliable principles and methods," and (3) "appl[y] the principles 
and methods reliably to the facts of the case."62 These criteria apply to risk 
assessment as much as to causation testimony. As Berger and Twerski argue, 
in specific cases, expert testimony based on a mosaic of evidence63 from 
sources that are frequently excluded when used to prove causation-such as 
anecdotal evidence,64 animal studies,65 chemical structure analysis,66 in vitro 
60. But see note 59 and accompanying text (noting that Berger and Twerski praise highly 
questionable court decisions on other issues). 
61. Berger and Twerski earlier sound a more cautionary note, stating that "courts will have to 
remain alert to the dangers of allowing junk science to enter the courtroom" and that courts should 
ferret out "unworthy and frivolous claims." Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 280. But their later 
focus on the credentials of expert risk assessors suggests an unduly narrow interpretation of "junk 
science" and "unworthy and frivolous claims." Id. 
62. FED. R. Evm. 702. 
63. See Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (popularizing 
the "mosaic" concept in toxic tort litigation). 
64. David H. Kaye & David A. Freedman, Reference Guide on Statistics, in REFERENCE 
MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 91-92 (Federal Judicial Center ed., 2d ed. 2000) (discussing the 
general unreliability of anecdotal evidence of causation). 
65. For articles noting the difficulty of extrapolating teratogenicity to humans from animal 
studies, see, for example, Koren et al., supra note 22, at 1131; Louis Lasagna, Predicting Human 
Drug Safety from Animal Studies: Current Issues, 12 J. TOXICOLOGICAL Sc1. 439, 442-43 (1987). 
Similar problems arise with regard to animal studies and cancer. 
66. See Deluca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 791 F. Supp. 1042, 1054 (D.N.J. 1992), ajf'd, 6 
F.3d 778 (3d Cir. 1993) (concluding that there is no evidence that Bendectin is associated with birth 
defects simply because other drugs with similar chemical structures are associated with birth de­
fects). 
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studies,67 and preliminary epidemiological studies68--could, taken together, 
be sufficient to objectively warrant a warning about a product.69 But the 
mere fact that a "qualified" adversarial expert is willing to testify that a 
product was sufficiently risky to require a warning does not make his testi­
mony sufficiently reliable to be admitted under Rule 702. 
In addition to the stringent requirements of Rule 702, there are sound 
reasons why courts are skeptical of "mosaic" testimony. The essential prob­
lem is that extrapolating from various types of evidence that are individually 
of dubious value to determine the riskiness of a product or substance inevi­
tably requires a certain amount of educated guesswork and even speculation. 
In a typical courtroom setting, however, the experts engaging in this guess­
work and speculation will not be neutral scientists chosen because of their 
expertise and objectivity. They will instead be adversarial experts chosen by 
the plaintiffs because the plaintiffs' attorney knows that they are willing to 
testify that they agree with his theory of the case. 
The problem with such adversarial experts is twofold. First, the experts 
in question may be hired guns "who view their role less as helping the trier 
of fact and more as aiding the cause of the attorneys who hired them."70 Sec­
ond, given liberal expert qualification standards,71 especially for medical 
testimony, many "qualified" experts who are chosen to testify in toxic torts 
cases are outliers who hold views far outside the mainstream of their profes­
sions, with little if any valid evidence supporting their views. Over the 
years, the courts have been flooded with qualified experts who seem to be­
lieve sincerely in various forms of quackery.72 
Between the outlier problem and the hired gun problem, plaintiffs attor­
neys have had no difficulty finding qualified experts willing to testify to 
causal relationships lacking sound scientific support, 73 even when, as was 
the case with Bendectin, a solid line of epidemiological studies contradicted 
67. See Brent, supra note 10, at 342 (stating that in vitro studies "can never establish human 
teratogenicity by themselves"). 
68. See Gary Taubes, Epidemiology Faces its Umits, 269 SCIENCE 1 64  ( 1995) (noting that 
epidemiology is subject to systematic errors, biases, and con founders). 
69. See, e.g., INST. OF MED. & NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NAT'L ACADS., DIETARY 
SUPPLEMENTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING SAFETY 255-60 (2004). 
70. DAVID H. KAYE ET AL., THE NEW WIGMORE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 1 .2 (2004). 
7 1 .  Id.§2. 1 .  
72. For example, for decades, many qualified experts testified that physical trauma to a body 
part can cause cancer. More recently, qualified experts have testified that minor exposure to radia­
tion causes a huge increase in cancer risk, and that exposure to chemical fumes can cause the body's 
immune system to shut down, leaving the victim "allergic to everything." See FOSTER ET AL., supra 
note 1 8, at 299-317, 359-99. Qualified experts have also provided extremely tendentious testimony 
in asbestos litigation, finding that almost every person referred to them by plaintiffs' attorneys has 
been harmed by asbestos exposure, however minimal. See David E. Bernstein, Keeping Junk Science 
Out of Asbestos Litigation, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 1 1  (2003); cf In re Silica Prods. Liab. Litig., 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 563 (S.D. Tex. 2005) (describing in excruciating detail the inadequacies and unreasonable­
ness of plaintiffs' experts' testimony). 
73. See generally FOSTER ET AL., supra note 18 (discussing expert testimony on various 
causation issues that was at variance with the consensus of scientific research and opinion on those 
issues). 
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their views. It would likely be even easier to find an expert willing to testify 
to his purchased or idiosyncratic views regarding a mere risk. Given the fact 
that "[s]cience can never demonstrate the absence of hazard, still less the 
absence of 'reasonable' grounds for anxiety," but "can only place an upper 
limit on risk,"74 fear of professional embarrassment is less likely to deter 
experts from speculating regarding risk than regarding causation. While ex­
cluding mosaic evidence may lead to some "false negatives," it is likely to 
exclude far more "false positives," and courts would be well-served to de­
mand a guarantee of reliability beyond the say-so of the adversarial expert.75 
An additional and related problem with the Berger and Twerski proposal 
is that it would present an irresistible lure to interest groups to promote 
junk-science-based lawsuits that would further their goals. One can already 
point to many examples of interest groups helping to spawn and sustain liti­
gation based on extremely weak evidence where the plaintiffs were, at least 
in theory, required to meet traditional causation requirements.76 It would be 
even easier for interest groups to stir up or engage in litigation when all that 
is required for victory is some marginal evidence of "risk." 
For example, several preliminary epidemiological studies-more evi­
dence than the Bendectin plaintiffs ever had-have suggested that abortion 
increases the risk of breast cancer.77 Even though those studies have since 
been debunked,78 anti-abortion groups have nevertheless seized on them to 
argue that women should be warned about the risk of breast cancer before 
they can have abortions. Under the informed choice proposal, it would seem 
to logically follow that abortion providers should be subject to lawsuits by 
women who had abortions and later contracted breast cancer.79 
74. Id. at 435. 
75. For example, courts confronted with what appears to be speculative, but potentially 
accurate, "mosaic" evidence, as in the Parlodel litigation, could use their authority under Federal 
Rule of Evidence 706 and state equivalents to call a panel of neutral experts to evaluate the plain­
tiffs' causation claim. See Soldo v. Sandoz Pharm. Corp., 244 F. Supp. 2d 434 (W.D. Pa. 2003) 
(doing exactly that). But that is a subject for another article. 
76. See FOSTER ET AL., supra note 18, at 32-33 (mentioning oral contraceptives, Bendectin, 
dioxin, and PCBs); Bernstein, supra note 18, at 46�6, 469-70 (discussing silicone breast im­
plants). 
77. E.g., Janet R. Daling, Risk of Breast Cancer Among Young Women: Relationship to In­
duced Abortion, 86 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 1584 (1994); Holly L. Howe et al., Early Abortion and 
Breast Cancer Risk among Women under Age 40, 18 INT. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 300 (1989); Polly A. 
Newcomb et al., Pregnancy Termination in Relation to Risk of Breast Cancer, 275 J. AM. MED. 
Ass'N 283 (1996); M.C. Pike et al., Oral Contraceptive Use and Early Abortion as Risk Factors for 
Breast Cancer in Young Women, 43 BRIT. J. CANCER 726 (1981). 
78. See, e.g. , Valerie Beral et al., Breast Cancer and Abortion: Collaborative Reanalysis of 
Data from 53 Epidemiological Studies, Including 83,000 Women with Breast Cancer from 16 Coun­
tries, 363 LANCET 1007, 1016 (2004); Committee on Gynecologic Practice, American College of 
Obstetricians and Gynecologists, ACOG Committee Opinion: Induced Abortion and Breast Cancer 
Risk, 83 INT'L J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 233 (2003). 
79. Indeed, though they analogize their tort to informed consent in medical practice, Berger 
and Twerski's proposal could easily be expanded beyond the medical context, and permit individu­
als to sue based on lack of informed consent to the purported risks from fluoride in the drinking 
water, pesticide residue on fruit, brief exposure to carbon monoxide in parking garages, and so on. 
Certainly, dentists would be on the hook for not warning patients of the "risk" from mercury in 
1974 Michigan Law Review 
B. Juries Are Not Competent to Determine Subtle 
Risk Assessment Issues 
[Vol. 104:1961 
Berger and Twerski write that their proposal requires juries to decide 
"whether the signs of risk and their potential gravity were sufficiently strong 
to require a drug manufacturer to alert physicians so that they in tum can 
provide information to patients that will enable them to make a meaningful 
choice."80 Such risks need not be "significant enough to warrant forceful or 
drastic action by the FDA such as requiring black box warnings or removing 
the drug from the market."81 Yet, if data supporting the existence of risk was 
discovered after the company made its decision not to warn, there is little 
reason to believe that jurors (or judges) are competent to make such subtle 
determinations. 82 After all, they have no expertise in science in general or 
risk assessment in particular, are privy only to paid adversarial expert testi­
mony, and are subject to hindsight bias.83 
Indeed, juries have often proven themselves incapable of making "easy" 
scientific determinations--often finding, for example, in favor of Bendectin 
and breast implant plaintiffs despite a lack of reliable evidence on even gen­
eral causation.84 Juries are even less likely to accurately resolve far more 
difficult and subtle claims of "failure to warn of a risk that the defendant 
knew or should have known but that doesn't rise to the level where the FDA 
should take action." 
Ironically, Twerski himself has warned against open-ended failure-to­
warn schemes precisely because juries have no sound way of making the 
determinations required, concluding that "the standards governing failure­
to-warn negligence claims provide restraints on jury discretion that are so 
inadequate as to be virtually nonexistent. . . . [T]he problem resides in the 
fact that the standards governing failure to warn too frequently rely on un-
fillings. See, e.g., Amalgam/Mercury Dental Filling Toxicity, http://www.holisticmed.com/dental/ 
amalgam/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2006). For the scientific evidence, see Stephen Barrett, The Mercury 
Amalgam Scam: How Anti-Amalgamists Swindle People, QUACKWATCH, Nov. 18, 2004, http:// 
www.quackwatch.org/O I QuackeryRelatedTopics/mercury.html, and ADA Statement on Dental 
Amalgam (2002), http://www.ada.org/prof/resources/positions/statements/amalgam.asp. 
80. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 278. 
81. Id. 
82. See generally Isaac M. Lipkus et al., General Performance on a Numeracy Scale among 
Highly Educated Samples, 21 MED. DECISION MAKING 37, 37 (2001) (concluding that "even highly 
educated participants have difficulty with relatively simple numeracy questions"). The problem of 
lack of jury competence to deal with complex scientific issues is recognized throughout the common 
law world. See David E. Bernstein, Junk Science in the United States and the Commonwealth, 21 
YALE J. INT'L L. 123 (1996) 
83. See generally Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hind­
sight, 65 U. CHI. L. REv. 2 (1998). 
84. For Bendectin, see SANDERS, supra note 5, at 118; for breast implants, see Bernstein, 
supra note 18. A more recent example is "toxic mold" cases. See Daniel Fisher, Dr. Mold, FORBES, 
Apr. 11, 2005, at I 00. 
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available data and unverifiable facts."85 Twerski's critique applies precisely 
to his and Berger's informed choice proposal. 
C. Even Assuming Juror Competence, the Proposal 
Asks Too Much of Juries 
Berger and Twerski argue that informed choice plaintiffs should also be 
permitted to present evidence of causation to the jury. The court would rule 
on the Rule 702 issue with regard to causation only at the end of the trial. If 
the court excluded that evidence, "[p ]lain tiffs would then be free to use the 
testimony of their experts to support their claim for informed choice."86 
The jury, then, would be in the position of knowing that qualified ex­
perts, relying on what these experts (but not the non-expert judge) believe to 
be reliable evidence, think that the product in question more likely than not 
caused the plaintiff's horrible injury; that plaintiff has, due to this injury, 
suffered grievous and costly physical and emotional harm; and, potentially, 
that the defendant has allegedly engaged in all sorts of misconduct warrant­
ing punitive damages. The jury is then supposed to ignore the causation and 
damages evidence they just heard and dispassionately decide whether the 
evidence of "risk" presented by the plaintiff's experts warrants granting the 
plaintiff emotional distress damages based on lack of informed choice, 
knowing that if they rule for the defendants on this issue, the plaintiff will 
receive no compensation. 
To expect such dispassion after juries hear evidence on both causation 
and damages requires an unwarranted belief in the ability of juries both to 
follow limiting instructions87 and to ignore their emotions.ss The latter is 
especially problematic because good trial attorneys are masters at appealing 
to juries' emotions.s9 One likely outcome in many informed choice cases 
would be that jurors would implicitly shift the burden to defendants to prove 
that there was no risk worth warning about.90 Because, as noted previously, 
85. James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: 
The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 290 (1 990). 
86. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 287. 
87. Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information ? The Difficulty of 
Deliberately Disregarding, 153 U. PA. L. REv. 1 25 1 ,  1260--76 (2005) (reviewing the evidence that 
individuals in general, and jurors in particular, are frequently unable to willfully ignore relevant 
information, and that, in fact, jurors sometimes give more weight to evidence they are told to ig­
nore). 
88. See Kari Edwards & Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by Instructions to 
Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 PERSONALITY & Soc. PsvcHoL. 
BULL. 849, 856 ( 1997) (concluding that information that elicits emotions is especially difficult to 
ignore). 
89. See WALTER K. OLSON, THE RULE OF LAWYERS 237-62 (2003) (detailing "[t]he [a]rt of 
the [r]unaway [j]ury"); Bernstein, supra note 1 8, at 495-96 (providing examples from the breast 
implant litigation). 
90. Such implicit burden-shifting already occurs even with regard to causation issues. See, 
e.g. , Bernstein, supra note 1 8, at 496 (providing an example from the breast implant litigation). 
Such burden-shifting would not necessarily trouble Professor Berger, who has previously advocated 
1976 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 104: 1 961  
science can't prove a negative, this would mean that the defendants would 
generally lose. 
D. The Proposal Ignores the Problems Inherent to Multiple Trials 
Let's assume arguendo that despite the problems noted above, 90% of 
juries reach the objectively correct conclusion on informed choice claims. A 
manufacturer of a popular and perfectly safe product could still face thou­
sands of successful claims. 
For example, even with a 90% success rate, Merrell Dow Pharmaceuti­
cals, manufacturer of Bendectin, could have faced liability from over twenty 
thousand women who claimed that they should have been warned that Ben­
dectin could cause heart defects in their offspring.91 The efficient response 
for Merrell Dow once this success rate became clear would have been to 
settle all two hundred thousand plus claims for ten cents on the dollar. If 
each successful plaintiff was awarded an average of fifty thousand dollars in 
"dignitary" damages, Merrell Dow would have been forced to pay over one 
billion dollars, and would also have been on the hook for the expenses and 
distractions of litigation. In fact, this may significantly underestimate poten­
tial damages, as Berger and Twerski do not suggest any standards that would 
constrain jury awards, and juries would undoubtedly feel sympathy for 
plaintiffs whose children were born with significant birth defects. No ra­
tional legal system would expose innocent manufacturers to such risk.92 
E. The Proposal Fails to Consider the Potential Costs 
of Informed Choice Litigation 
One cost of informed choice litigation involves those who, out of fear 
generated by the publicity attending lawsuits (often stoked by plaintiffs' 
attorneys and public relations firms they hire), avoid using a safe product 
that could be useful to them. For example, as a result of the Bendectin litiga­
tion many women fail to get treatment for nausea during pregnancy because 
of unfounded fears of teratogenicity.93 For that matter, many doctors became 
burden-shifting in certain toxic torts cases. Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: 
Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2 1 17,  21 44-45 ( 1997). 
I criticize Berger's proposal and like-minded proposals, while suggesting an alternative mechanism 
for encouraging corporations to engage in appropriate behavior with regard to risk, in Bernstein, 
supra note 1 8. 
9 1 .  Brent, supra note I 0, at 340 (noting that statistically, one would expect that collectively 
the women who ingested Bendectin would give birth to two hundred and forty thousand children 
with congenital heart malformations, the same ratio as for women not exposed to Bendectin). 
92. Another possibility, explicitly raised by Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 287-88, is 
that in the absence of any requirement of individualized inquiry-which generally prevents pharma­
ceutical cases from being aggregated-informed choice claims would typically be aggregated into 
massive class actions. This would put defendants in the position of either betting the company on 
favorable jury verdicts or settling, likely for significantly more than the underlying value of the 
individual claims. The author thanks Richard Nagareda for suggesting that I address this point. 
93. Paolo Mazzotta et al., The Perception of Teratogenic Risk by Women with Nausea and 
Vomiting of Pregnancy 1 3  REPROD. TOXICOLOGY 3 1 3  (1999); Koren et al., supra note 22. 
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afraid to recommend any medication for NVP, including a version of Ben­
dectin that could be created by combining two over-the-counter 
ingredients. 94 
Publicized warnings of purported risks "may create stress whether the 
warnings are realistic or not."95 Some individuals may even engage in truly 
risky or damaging actions to avoid a phantom risk. Publicity over Bendec­
tin 's purported association with birth defects led at least seven women to 
abort their unborn children because they were afraid that their ingestion of 
Bendectin would lead to birth defects.96 Many women unnecessarily had 
their breast implants explanted after claims that implants are associated with 
immune system disease or cancer were circulated in the media by litigants 
and activist groups.97 Others underwent costly, unnecessary, and risky treat­
ments to combat nonexistent implant-related ailments; many more delayed 
getting treatment for the true underlying causes of their medical problems.98 
Parents hesitated to vaccinate their children because of unsubstantiated 
claims, currently pending in a major class action, that thimerosal, a pre­
servative used until recently in vaccines, causes autism.99 And so on. 
Another cost of contentious litigation over scientific issues is the burden 
it places on the scientific community. Litigation often leads to onerous dis­
covery requests to, or even harassment of, scientists whose work on the 
issue conflicts with one side's legal position. For example, a scientist who 
conducted a study on Bendectin reports that an attorney subpoenaed all of 
the original records involved in the study, including 4,500 interviews, com­
puter tapes, and all printed computer output.100 This material was never used 
by the attorney. Epidemiologists conducting research on breast implants 
were subpoenaed to provide "huge quantities of primary data in a reportedly 
intimidating manner."101 
Finally, there is the cost to innovation. For example, unjustified litigation 
over products such as Bendectin, spermicides, and birth control pills spurred 
F l .  
94. See Gina Kolata, Controversial Drug Makes a Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at 
95. Paul R. Lees-Haley & Richard S. Brown, Biases in Perception and Reporting Following 
a Perceived Toxic Exposure, 75 PERCEPTUAL & MOTOR SKILLS 5 3 1 ,  532 ( 1992). 
96. Strong, supra note 29, at 656. 
97. See, e.g., Norris v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 397 F.3d 878, 880 ( I  0th Cir. 2005) (noting 
that plaintiff had her implants removed because of fear that they were causing "silicone-induced 
lupus"). 
98. See MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE Ct.ASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE AND THE 
LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 147- 1 5 1  ( 1996). 
99. For the latest media hysteria on this issue, see Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., Deadly Immunity, 
SALON.COM, http://www.salon.com/news/feature/2005/06/l 6/thimerosal/index I .html. For a thorough 
debunking, see Salon.com Hushes its Credibility Down the Toilet, http://oracknows.blogspot.com/ 
2005/06/saloncom-flushes-its-credibility-down.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2006). 
100. Michael B. Bracken, A/arums False, A/arums Real: Challenges and Threats to the Future 
of Epidemiology, 8 ANNALS EPIDEMIOLOGY 79, 80 (1998). 
1 0 1 .  Id. 
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a decline in contraceptive research;102 unjustified lawsuits against vaccines 
led to a decline in vaccine research;103 and unjustified lawsuits against breast 
implants threatened entire categories of medical products research.104 
At least in federal court, Rule 702, incorporating and clarifying the 
Daubert trilogy, has removed much of the danger of liability for causation 
based on unreliable evidence. But Berger and Twerski would have plaintiffs 
get around Rule 702 by suing for informed choice. While successful in­
formed choice actions would individually be less remunerative for plaintiffs 
than successful causation actions would be,105 it would be much easier for 
plaintiffs to meet the burden of proof and persuade judges and juries to rule 
in their favor. Pharmaceutical companies would therefore likely face far 
more lawsuits for lack of informed choice than they ever faced for causa­
tion. Under such circumstances, "[ w ]ho in his right mind . . .  would work on 
a product that would be used by pregnant women?"106 
F. The Informed Choice Proposal Would Lead 
to a Vast Surfeit of Warnings 
Berger and Twerski acknowledge that "there is little social utility in pro­
viding information that is so tentative and unreliable that it will serve no 
purpose other than to frighten patients who need the drug away from its 
use."107 But given the issues discussed above, if drug manufacturers wanted 
to immunize themselves from unpredictable and potentially unlimited liabil­
ity, they would, if courts found that it shielded them, likely warn doctors and 
patients about every conceivable risk. Perhaps a standard disclaimer along 
the lines of "this drug has been proven safe and effective to the satisfaction 
of the FDA, but it may cause birth defects, cancer, stroke, hypertension, 
hives, convulsions, sexual dysfunction and [use your imagination]" would 
become standard. Such defensive warnings would be worse than useless­
they would diminish the impact and credibility of warnings based on sub-
102. Peter Huber, Litigation Thwarts Innovation in the U.S. , SCI. AM., Mar. 1989, at 1 20; see 
also Elizabeth B. Connell, The Cost of Frivolous Lawsuits, FAMILY PRACTICE NEWS, Jan. 15 ,  2004, 
at 1 4, available at http://www.familypracticenews.com/article/PIIS03007073047 12220/fulltext. 
103. See, e.g., Henry I. Miller, How Lawsuits Can Kil/, SCRIPPS HOWARD NEWS SERVICE, 
Dec. 9, 2004, available at http://www.shns.com/shns/g_index2.cfm?action=detail&pk=FLU- 1 2-09-
04. 
104. See Bernstein, supra note 1 8. 
105. Disturbingly, however, Berger and Twerski praise the New Jersey Supreme Court's opin­
ion in Canesi v. Wilson, 730 A.2d 805 (N.J. 1 999), in which a victim of lack of "informed choice," 
resulting in "wrongful birth," was awarded damages not just for emotional injury, but for the cost of 
raising a baby with a birth defect, despite the absence of evidence from plaintiffs' experts of a con­
nection between the defect and the product ingested. 
106. See Huber, supra note 102 (quoting an anonymous president of a pharmaceutical com­
pany, speaking in 1986 of the litigation-oriented disincentives to engage in such research). 
107. Berger & Twerski, supra note 2, at 279. 
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stantiated concerns and make it more difficult for �hysicians and patients to 
properly weigh the risks and benefits of a product.1 8 
G. The Informed Choice Proposal May Be Barred 
by the Preemption Doctrine 
In a case involving an allegation that Pfizer failed to warn of the alleged 
risk of suicide from taking Zoloft, the FDA filed an amicus brief arguing 
that "[t]o require a warning of a supposed danger that FD A  concludes has 
no actual scientific basis, no matter the warning's language, would be to 
require a statement that would be false and misleading, and thus contrary to 
federal law."109 The FDA, for example, would not have approved a label 
warning that Bendectin may cause birth defects, and, according to the FDA 
(and at least one district court), any common law claim based on failure to 
warn that Bendectin may cause birth defects would be preempted. 1 10 While 
the FDA's position is thus far a minority view among federal courts that 
have addressed the issue,111 the ultimate outcome of the preemption issue 
awaits Supreme Court decision. 
CONCLUSION 
The specific problems Berger and Twerski purport to address with their 
informed choice proposal-the inadequacy of premarket review for detect­
ing small but material risks from pharmaceutical products and the failure of 
the current federal regulatory system to adequately address postmarket 
safety review-are serious ones.112 But given the inability of the tort system 
1 08. See Doe v. Miles Labs., Inc., 927 F.2d 1 87 (4th Cir. 1 99 1 )  ("If pharmaceutical companies 
were required to warn of every suspected risk that could possibly attend the use of a drug, the con­
suming public would be so barraged with warnings that it would undermine the effectiveness of 
these warnings.") (emphasis in original); Henderson & Twerski, supra note 85, at 296 ('The most 
significant social cost generated by requiring [defendants] to warn against remote risks is the re­
duced effectiveness of potentially helpful warnings directed towards risks which are not remote."). 
For a discussion of some of the difficulties consumers face in deciphering even rather basic pharma­
ceutical safety information, see P. Knapp et al., Comparison of Two Methods of Presenting Risk 
Information to Patients About the Side Effects of Medicines, 1 3  QUALITY & SAFETY IN HEALTH 
CARE 176 (2004). 
1 09. Amicus Brief for the United States in Support of the Defendant-Appellee and Cross­
Appellant, and in Favor of Reversal of the District Court's Order Denying Partial Summary Judg­
ment to Defendant-Appellee & Cross-Appellant at 2, Motus v. Pfizer, Inc., 358 F.3d 659 (9th Cir. 
2004) (Nos. 02-5537 1 ,  02-55498), 2002 WL 32303084, at *2. 
I JO. Ehlis v. Shire Richwood, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 2d 1 189, 1 198 (D.N.D. 2002), ajf'd on other 
ground, 367 F.3d 1 0 1 3  (8th Cir. 2004). 
1 1 1 . See Cartwright v. Pfizer, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 3d 876 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
1 1 2. See Funmilayo 0. Ajayi et al., Adverse Drug Reactions: A Review of Relevant Factors, 
40 J. CLINICAL PHARMACOLOGY 1093, 1099 (2000) (concluding that the safety profile of a newly 
marketed drug cannot be fully understood until two to three years after it reaches the market); 
Charles L. Bennett et al., The Research on Adverse Drug Events and Reports (RADAR) Project, 293 
J. AM. MED. Ass'N. 2 1 3 1  (2005); Timothy Brewer & Graham A. Colditz, Postmarketing Surveil­
lance and Adverse Drug Reactions: Current Perspective and Future Needs, 28 1 J. AM. MED. Ass'N 
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as it is currently situated to address product safety in general-and drug 
safety in particular-in a rational, scientifically justifiable manner, the least 
attractive possible response to the postmarket review problem is to create a 
new, broad, open-ended common law tort. The tort conceived by Berger and 
Twerski is especially problematic because it virtually invites attorneys to 
bring claims based on junk science, fails to take any account of the limita­
tions of juries, and would almost certainly have counterproductive overall 
safety effects. In fact, the proposed informed choice tort seems more de­
signed to allow plaintiffs an end run around Daubert/Rule 702 than to 
113 address the problems noted above. 
By contrast, Professor Catherine Struve has recently proposed114 a hybrid 
qui tam system, subject to opt-in or opt-out by drug companies, that ( 1 )  is a 
clever rejoinder to the advocates of absolute FDA preemption; (2) takes de­
termination of the scientific merits of claims that a company is concealing a 
hazard away from random panels of lay jurors and gives it to scientific ex­
perts at the FDA; and (3) provides incentives for potential claimants to 
discover real hazards instead of giving plaintiffs' attorneys incentives to pur­
sue lucrative, albeit bogus, cases.1 1 5 While this brief response is not the 
appropriate forum for a full-fledged discussion of Struve's proposal, I com­
mend it to readers as a starting point for thinking about how better 
postmarket review of pharmaceutical safety can be achieved.116 
824 (1999) (discussing the incompleteness of premarket trials); D. M. Roden, An Underrecognized 
Challenge in Evaluating Postmarketing Drug Safety, 1 1 1  CIRCULATION 246 (2004). 
1 13. Otherwise, why require that the plaintiff show that she actually suffered the injury not 
warned against? Why not let all consumers deprived of their "dignity" through lack of informed 
choice, injured or not, sue? Also, if Dean Twerski is not implicitly endorsing an end run around 
Daubert I find it very difficult to reconcile his advocacy of an informed choice tort with his scathing 
critique of emotional distress damages for asymptomatic asbestos plaintiffs. See James A. Hender­
son, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Asbestos Litigation Gone Mad: Exposure-based Recovery for 
Increased Risk, Mental Distress, and Medical Monitoring, 53 S .C. L. REV. 8 1 5  (2002). Not to men­
tion that part of the article's title is "Unmasking Daubert." 
Berger and Twerski do raise significant concerns regarding whether Daubert as interpreted by 
Rule 702 is sometimes too burdensome for plaintiffs with legitimate causation claims. To the extent 
that such concerns are valid, they need to be directly addressed in a way that permits valid claims to 
proceed without reopening the floodgates to junk science, not indirectly through a poorly conceived 
informed choice action. 
1 14. Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing Surveillance, Com­
pensation, and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH PoL'Y, L. & ETHICS 587 (2005). 
1 15. I briefly sketched a system that would provide incentives for knowledgeable "insiders" to 
report safety hazards ignored by corporations. See supra note 1 8. My approach is consistent with, 
though different from, Struve's. 
1 16. A more radical solution to the problem of asymmetries in (and the absence of) informa­
tion regarding pharmaceutical safety would be to create information markets to predict the 
probability that the manufacturer or the FDA will, over some long time horizon, permanently recall 
or revoke permission to distribute a drug. See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Adminis­
trative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 7 1  U. CHI. L. REv. 933, 992-93 
(2004). A potential problem with this proposal is that it may provide information market investors 
with an incentive to spread false information about a product. Merrell Dow pulled Bendectin from 
the market because of a successful public relations campaign by plaintiffs' attorneys with a financial 
interest in demonizing these products, not because of any underlying evidence that they were un­
safe. 
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Instead of addressing this issue head-on, Berger and Twerski's informed 
choice proposal seeks to provide either peace of mind from, or compensa­
tion for, irrational, unsubstantiated fears and regrets. Thus, Betty Mekdeci 
(and presumably thousands of others) should have been able to recover from 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals for her unsubstantiated fear that Bendectin 
caused her son's birth defect and for her concomitant regret that she in-
d B d . 1 17 geste en econ. 
The real victims of the Bendectin saga, meanwhile, were women who 
unnecessarily became frightened that they had harmed their babies by taking 
Bendectin (including those unfortunate few who aborted their unborn chil­
dren); women who have gone without treatment for NVP because of the 
litigation-induced withdrawal of Bendectin from the market and the accom­
panying hysteria; women who continue to have a dearth of NVP treatments, 
contraceptives, and other medical choices because medical companies have 
learned from the Bendectin cases and other products liability litigation that 
such products are "litogens" and therefore avoid them; and finally, Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, its shareholders, and its insurer, which faced pro­
tracted and expensive litigation based on unsubstantiated and incorrect 
allegations. These victims would find no comfort in Berger and Twerski's 
proposal, which does not address the harm that victims of junk science­
based litigation suffer. Nor does Berger and Twerski's proposal address how 
to prevent the recurrence of such harms. Under Berger and Twerski's pro­
posal, Merrell Dow would have been ruined financially even though the 
company's marketing of Bendectin caused no injuries. By contrast, those 
who have caused millions of American women to suffer unnecessarily by 
promoting and pursuing unjustified litigation against Merrell Dow-Betty 
Mekdeci, the Bendectin plaintiffs' attorneys, Public Citizen, the media, and 
hired-gun expert witnesses-would have faced no repercussions for the 
damage they caused. Berger and Twerski have misidentified the perpetra­
tors, the victims, and indeed the very essence of the Bendectin disaster. Not 
surprisingly, then, they have learned the wrong lessons from an American 
tragedy. 
1 1 7. It's not reassuring that Berger and Twerski, though addressing a perceived safety prob­
lem involving complex scientific issues, cite virtually no scientific or medical literature, preferring 
instead to rely on the work of law professors and judges. One of Daubert's most imponant achieve­
ments has been to focus the attention of the legal community on the underlying scientific basis of 
claims by experts, rather than relying on lay (or legal) notions of common sense in resolving scien­
tific claims. Cf Rubanick v. Witco Chem. Corp., 593 A.2d 733, 747 (N.J. 1 99 1 )  (absurdly relying on 
"common sense" for the proposition that PCBs cause colon cancer and foolishly relying on a law 
student's note for the (incorrect) assertion that 80% of all cancers are caused by exposure to envi­
ronmental toxins). By focusing attention, for example, on Betty Mekdeci's subjective feelings 
instead of the evidence she relied on, Berger and Twerski are encouraging their readers to take a 
giant step backwards to the pre-Daubert era. 
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